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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee Strawberry Water Users Association ("Strawberry")
agrees with the statement of jurisdiction contained in Appellant
Water Power Company's ("Water Power") principal brief.
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-505(1):
Intent:
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for
affidavits in support of attorneys' fees.
Applicability:
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees in
the trial courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys'
fees must be filed with the court and set forth specifically
the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work
performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to
prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time spent in
pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorneys' fees
are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for
comparable legal services.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Water Power appeals the trial court's denial of attorney
fees for the civil and administrative proceedings below and asks
for attorney fees expended on appeal.

(Appellant's Brief at 1 ) .

However, Water Power misconstrues the appropriate standard of
review for this issue.
This Court will affirm a trial court's denial of attorney
fees absent an abuse of discretion.

Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d

1188, 1198 (Utah 1993); Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 849 P.2d
1187, 1194 (Utah App. 1993), cert. den. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).

The proper standard is not, as Water Power contends, the
"correctness" standard used for reviewing summary judgments.
Water Power is not appealing the trial court's grant of summary
judgment against the causes of action in its Complaint, but the
denial of its incidental request for attorney fees.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and
Disposition in Court Below.
Water Power filed a Complaint against Strawberry in 1990
seeking damages for breach of contract, anticipatory breach of
contract, and declaratory relief.

(R. 24-33).

The trial court

granted Strawberry's Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground
that the causes of action raised in Water Power's Complaint were
moot.

The Court also denied plaintiff's belated and unsupported

request for an award of attorney fees.

(R. 268-9; 290) (Ruling

on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Order on Summary
Judgment attached as Addendum A ) .
B.

Statement of Facts.1

The parties entered an agreement in 19 83 calling for Water
Power to provide certain products and services in connection with
the construction of a hydroelectric powerhouse for Strawberry.
*Water Power does not cite to the record in its "Statement
of the Case," as required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
24(a)(7). Since there is no support for the statements contained
therein, Strawberry asks this Court at a minimum to disregard
Water Power's "Statement of the Case." Additionally, this Court
may disregard the issues presented on appeal for lack of
evidentiary basis and assume the correctness of the judgment
below as in English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 618-9
(Utah App. 1991).
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(R. 31) (contract attached as Addendum B ) .

Although both parties

assumed that the transaction was exempt from state sales, excise
or use tax, the agreement stated in boilerplate terms appended to
the contract that Strawberry Water would be responsible for the
payment of taxes.
1.

(R. 161).

AFTER ELECTING TO PURSUE ITS OWN TAX APPEAL, WATER
POWER CLAIMED STRAWBERRY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
INTEREST AND COSTS ACCRUED AFTER STRAWBERRY'S
APPEAL HAD BEEN RESOLVED.

In March 1987 the Utah State Tax Commission served Water
Power with a preliminary notice assessing Water Power for sales
made in connection with the agreement.

(R. 29-30).

A similar

notice was served on Strawberry for sales and use taxes due under
the same transaction.

(R. 65).

Both parties opposed the tax assessments.

(R. 130). They

initially agreed, upon Strawberry's suggestion, to consolidate
their petitions before the Tax Commission and divide legal fees.
(R. 130, 193). However, in August 1987, Water Power altered that
agreement by voluntarily choosing to pursue its appeal on its
own.

(R. 130; 160). Strawberry's tax appeal was resolved in

March 199 0 when the Tax Commission affirmed the assessment.
(R. 2, 29).
On December 21, 1990, many months after Strawberry's
administrative appeal was resolved and while Water Power's
administrative appeal was pending, Water Power filed a Complaint
against Strawberry in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah.
(R. 33). The Complaint alleged breach of contract and
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anticipatory breach of contract and sought as damages only the
amount of taxes plus interest assessed by the Tax Commission, or
$184,970.76.

(R. 25-7).

The Complaint also sought costs

incurred in pursuing the Tax Commission appeal but did not
include any request for attorney fees.

(R. 25-7).

On July 2,

1991, Strawberry sent Water Power a settlement offer of
$132,148.87, representing the principal amount of tax owing and
the majority of the penalty.

(R. 187, 189). Water Power never

responded to the offer in any fashion. (R. 201).
In September 1992, over two years after Strawberry obtained
resolution of its appeal, Water Power's appeal was resolved,
wherein the Tax Commission affirmed the tax.

(R. 124-6).

The

Tax Commission noted that Water Power had not raised any issues
substantially different from those raised by Strawberry in its
appeal.

(R. 125) .
2.

THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED ITS BROAD DISCRETION IN
DENYING WATER POWER'S VAGUE REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY
FEES.

On January 13, 1994, Water Power moved for summary judgment
on the ground that Strawberry should pay the tax liability
assessed against the parties.

(R. 182). Water Power also

mentioned without explanation that it was seeking attorney fees
"as provided in the contract."

(R. 176). Based upon a Rule

56(f) affidavit submitted by Strawberry, the court granted a
sixty-day continuance and directed Strawberry's counsel to
determine what it would take to satisfy the state for the taxes
due.

(R. 254, 261) .
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Strawberry's counsel then contacted the Tax Commission and
learned that the state would accept $120,135.00, the principal
amount of the tax, in full satisfaction of the assessment.
(R. 259, 261).
Shortly thereafter, Strawberry satisfied the tax warrant by
paying the Tax Commission $120,135.00, less than the amount it
offered to Water Power several years earlier.

(R. 268, 282-3).

With this satisfaction both Water Power and Strawberry were
released from further liability for the tax.

(R. 265).

Strawberry then submitted a motion for summary judgment on the
basis that Water Power's claims against it were extinguished by
the satisfaction of the tax warrant.

(R. 269). Water Power

opposed the motion, declaring without explanation or support
therefor that it was entitled to attorney fees for the tax appeal
and the civil lawsuit.

(R. 271-2).

The trial court granted

Strawberry's Motion for Summary Judgment and found an award of
attorneys fees unwarranted given the circumstances in the case.
In doing so, the court acted well within its discretion.
(R. 287).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:

Water Power cannot be awarded attorney fees based

solely upon the contract provision.

Not only did Water Power

fail to preserve this issue below, but the provision only applies
to prevailing parties in breach of contract actions.
Additionally, Water Power failed to demonstrate to the trial
court that the fees it requests are reasonable as required by the
-5-

contract provision and by Utah law.

Any attorney fees expended

by Water Power resulted from its refusal to join Strawberry in
appealing the tax assessments and in rejecting Strawberry's
settlement offer--an offer which was sufficient to satisfy the
Tax Commission.
POINT II;

Water Power also cannot be awarded attorney fees based

on the third party tort rule.

Water Power did not raise this

issue below, and in any event the theory can only be used if
attorney fees incurred were proximately caused by the tortious
acts of another person, which did not occur in this case.
POINT III:

Water Power cannot be awarded attorney fees on appeal

because it was not awarded attorney fees below.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
WATER POWER IS NOT
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES
UNDER THE CONTRACT PROVISION.
Water Power is not entitled to attorney fees incurred in the
administrative and civil proceedings below based on an
inapplicable contract provision that it cites for the first time
on appeal.

Neither can it demand attorney fees when it did not

request an award of attorney fees in its Complaint and when it
has made no showing that the fees requested are reasonable as
required by the contract and Utah law.

-6-

A. Water Power Cannot Rely On The Contractual Provision
Because It Is Not A Prevailing Party,
On appeal, Water Power bases its claim for attorney fees on
the following language in the contract between the parties:2
In the event of a breach of this Agreement, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to recover reasonable Attorney's
fees.
Thus, this provision only applies to benefit the party that
prevails in a breach of contract action.

While Water Power

brought a breach of contract claim against Strawberry, this claim
did not prevail.

The lower court granted Strawberry's motion for

summary judgment against all claims, including the breach of
contract claim.

Enforcing the contract according to its terms,

Water Power is ineligible for attorney fees since the court never
determined that Strawberry breached the contract.

See Stacey

Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1084-5 (Utah App. 1988)
(plaintiff who did not prevail on complaint for acceleration not
entitled to attorney fees under provision awarding them for
enforcement of contract); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d
985, 988 (Utah 1988) (attorney fees provided for in contract
allowed only in accordance with contractual terms).
Water Power has failed to point out how it might be
considered the prevailing party when summary judgment was granted
against it.
contract.

The court never ruled that Strawberry breached the
In Fashion Place Associates v. Glad Rags, 754 P.2d

940, 942 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court noted that in order to be
2

No such allegation or claim is raised in the Complaint.
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considered a "successful party" entitled to attorney fees under a
contract, the party must prevail both on legal theory and
damages.

Water Power prevailed on neither.

The court granted

summary judgment against its breach of contract claim, and it
could not show that it suffered damage because Strawberry paid
the tax assessment against them.

Water Power is not

contractually entitled to attorney fees because the provision
only applies to prevailing parties.
B. The Fees Requested By Water Power Are Not Reasonable As
Required By The Contract And By Utah Law.
1.

WATER POWER ITSELF HAS NEVER SUGGESTED THAT THE
AMOUNT IT REQUESTS IS REASONABLE.

Water Power made a blanket demand for attorneys fees without
any explanation or documentation whatsoever of that amount.
never submitted an itemization.
counsel.

It

It never filed an affidavit from

It never explained the nature of the legal services

performed.
Besides restricting attorney fees to only the prevailing
party in a breach of contract action, the contract provision
mandates that attorney fees be reasonable.

This requirement

parallels the common-law rule that even when a party is entitled
to attorney fees by contract, the fees requested must be
reasonable.

Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 219 (Utah App. 1990).

It is impossible for a court to determine whether attorney
fees are reasonable unless supporting evidence accompanies the
request.

In Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350

(Utah App. 1990), cert. den. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990), a party
-8-

sought attorney fees solely on the basis of a contractual provision without offering evidence that the particular amount sought
was justified.

The provision was less restrictive than the one

in this case, stipulating for the reimbursement of attorney fees
arising from all claims made by the other party.

The Court of

Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of fees, explaining
that
[i]t is well established that to justify a finding of a
reasonable attorney's fee, there must be evidence in support
of that finding.... It is beyond dispute that an evidentiary basis is a fundamental requirement for establishing an
award of attorney fees.
Ringwood, 786 P.2d at 1361 (citations omitted).
Rule 4-505 of the Code of Judicial Administration details
the format for presenting this evidentiary basis.

It requires

that an affidavit accompany a request for attorney fees which
set [s] forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the
nature of the work performed by the attorney, the number of
hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, ... and
affirm[s] the reasonableness of the fees for comparable
legal services.
Rule 4-505(1), Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
Water Power never submitted such an affidavit, much less
attempted to document the reasonableness of the fees in any other
form.
The presence of a contractual provision for attorney fees
does not automatically entitle a party to whatever amount it
demands.

Once it establishes that the contractual terms have

been satisfied, it must then provide evidentiary support for the
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amount requested in compliance with Rule 4-505.

Unless a party

does this, its request for fees simply cannot be entertained.
2.

WATER POWER'S DILATORY ACTIONS INDICATE THAT ITS
REQUEST IS UNREASONABLE.

After a party submits a Rule 4-505 affidavit, the trial
court may consider other factors to determine the reasonableness
of the fee requested.

Included among these factors is the

efficiency of the party in bringing and terminating the case.
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988-90 (Utah 1988).
The record demonstrates Water Power's lack of efficiency.
It initially agreed to share attorney fees by presenting a joint
appeal to the Tax Commission.

However, it later elected to pay

attorneys to pursue its own appeal.

Water Power's appeal ended

two years after Strawberry's appeal, presented the same issues
for consideration, and achieved the same result.
Water Power also resisted Strawberry's efforts to terminate
the civil action.

Only months after Water Power filed its

Complaint, Strawberry offered it enough money to satisfy the Tax
Commission's warrant.

In fact, Strawberry offered Water Power

over $12,000 more than the state accepted as full satisfaction
several years later.

Water Power failed to respond to this

offer, instead choosing to continue litigation until the court
terminated it more than three years later in Strawberry's favor.
Water Power refused an offer to settle the case which resulted in
more litigation and this appeal.

When a party declines such

gratuitous settlement offers, the court may appropriately deny
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attorney fees even if authorized by contract.

Cable Marine, Inc.

v. M/V Trust Me II, 632 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1980), cited with
approval in Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 n.3 (Utah App.
19 89) (Cable Marine attached as Addendum C ) .
At many points during the civil and administrative
proceedings, Strawberry gave Water Power opportunities to curtail
attorney fees.

Having refused each opportunity, Water Power must

absorb its self-generated expenses.
C. Water Power Has Not Preserved This Issue Below And Is
Therefore Barred From Presenting It On Appeal.
Water Power vaguely introduced its request for attorney fees
to the court below by stating that fees were provided for in the
contract.

It never cited the alleged provision nor attempted to

explain how the provision was applicable.

With nothing more

before it than a bare assertion that the contract allowed
attorney fees, the trial court properly rejected Water Power's
request.

This Court has previously stressed that "[t]he mere

mention of an issue...when no supporting evidence or relevant
legal authority is introduced...is insufficient to raise an issue
at trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal."
LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah
App. 1991).

Because Water Power does not comply with Utah Rule

of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5)(A), it is impossible to tell
where, if anywhere, it believes it preserved this issue with
sufficient specificity.

Water Power's obscure reference below to

"the contract" is insufficient to allow it on appeal finally to
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cite the contractual provision and present a full-fledged legal
argument.
POINT II
WATER POWER CANNOT RECEIVE
ATTORNEY FEES UNDER THE THIRD PARTY TORT RULE.
This Court should reject Water Power's contention that
Strawberry must pay attorney fees incurred in the Tax Commission
appeal because Strawberry "forced" it to appeal.3

(Appellant's

Brief at 9 ) . The third party tort rule is inapplicable to this
case.
A. The Facts And Context Of This Case Make The Third Party
Tort Rule Inapplicable.
The third-party tort rule allows a party to recover
reasonable attorney fees incurred in pursuing litigation with a
third party that are a natural consequence of one's negligence.
Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur.. 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993).

This

rule cannot apply to the present situation, primarily because
Strawberry has not committed a negligent or otherwise tortious
act.

Although Water Power claims for the first time on appeal

that it became liable for the tax due to Strawberry's
"negligent, or intentional" nonpayment, Water Power has never
before suggested that Strawberry acted tortiously.

(Appellant's

Brief at 9 ) . Nothing prevented Water Power from including a
cause of action for negligence or intentional tort in its
3

Water Power's claim is curious given the fact that at the
time the assessments were made both Strawberry and Water Power
believed the assessments were invalid and determined to appeal
the assessments.
-12-

Complaint, but Water Power chose to limit its allegations against
Strawberry to breach of contract,

At any rate, Water Power cites

no support in the record to establish that Strawberry committed
tortious conduct.
The third-party tort rule also does not apply to this case
because Water Power has not shown that it incurred attorney fees
in the administrative proceeding as a natural consequence of
Strawberry's actions.

To the contrary, Water Power chose to

initiate its own appeal entirely of its own volition.

Had it not

reneged on the agreement to pursue a joint appeal, it would never
have incurred the "consequential damages" it is now claiming.
B.

Water Power Did Not Preserve This Issue For Appeal.

As with its contractual basis for attorney fees, Water Power
did not preserve the third party tort rule issue below.

There is

absolutely no mention in the record of this rule as a means of
awarding attorney fees.

Because Water Power did not present this

argument to the court below, this Court should disregard it.

See

Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059 (Utah App. 1995) (claim for
attorney fees under statute raised for first time on appeal
cannot be considered).
Water Power cannot rely on the newly-raised third party tort
rule as a means of receiving attorney fees incurred in the Tax
Commission appeal.

The rule was never meant to stretch to every

situation where a party claims it incurred legal fees due to
another party's actions.
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POINT III
WATER POWER CANNOT RECEIVE
ATTORNEY FEES FOR THIS APPEAL.
A party may only be awarded attorney fees for appeal if
received attorney fees below and prevails on appeal.
Stangl. 869 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1994).

Wade v.

Because the lower court

properly denied Water Power's claim for attorney fees, Water
Power is not entitled to attorney fees expended on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Water Power has failed to demonstrate that the lower court
abused its discretion in denying attorney fees.

It asks this

Court for an award of attorney fees based upon arguments that
were not presented to the lower court.

Even so, the contract

provision and third party tort rule arguments are meritless.
Finally, Water Power has made no attempt to show that the fees
demands are reasonable.

Strawberry requests that this Court

affirm the lower court's denial of attorney fees.
DATED this / D ^ K day of August, 1995.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By_

-, r.
-J^m^^fj
Rjeed L. Martineau
cyan E. Tibbitts
Julianne P. Blanch
Attorneys for Appellee
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ADDENDUM A:
Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Order on Summary Judgment

7!

REED L. MARTINEAU (A2106)
R Y A N E . T I B B I T T S (A4423)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
A t t o r n e y s for D e f e n d a n t
10 E x c h a n g e P l a c e , Eleventh Floor
P o s t Office Box 45000
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84145
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 521-9000

r' ACj
A[

r- ** - \fi

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
WATER POWER COMPANY, a U t a h
corporation,
ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
STRAWBERRY WATER USERS
ASSOCIATION, a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ,

C a s e No. 900400932CV
J u d g e L y n n Davis

Defendant.

This matter

having

come b e f o r e

the

C o u r t on D e f e n d a n t ' s

Motion

for

Summary J u d g m e n t , b o t h p a r t i e s h a v i n g s u b m i t t e d memoranda in s u p p o r t of t h e i r
r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s , a n d t h e m a t t e r h a v i n g now b e e n s u b m i t t e d for d e c i s i o n , t h e
C o u r t , a f t e r c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r i n g t h e memoranda s u b m i t t e d b y c o u n s e l ,

hereby

ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.

T h e f a c t s as s e t f o r t h in D e f e n d a n t s initial memoranda w e r e not

d i s p u t e d b y Plaintiff a n d , t h e r e f o r e , t h e C o u r t a d o p t s t h o s e facts a n d a c c e p t s
them as t r u e ;
2»

Based upon the unique facts and circumstances s u r r o u n d i n g

this

m a t t e r , t h e C o u r t is not i n c l i n e d t o a w a r d Plaintiff a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s ;

290

3.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and

judgment is awarded in favor of Defendant, no cause of action, on all claims
asserted by Plaintiff.

DATED

Each p a r t y to bear their own costs and fees.

/£

C/7Hr/^

/ ^ ^ ^

BY

THE

.
COURT:

^/Qfe'l'TA

YNN DAVIS/
District Court Judge

** '1

UTAH ^

-2-

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Cynthia Northstrom, being duly sworn, says that she is employed by the law
offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for Defendant herein; that
she served the attached Order on Summary Judgment (Case Number 900400932CV,
Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah) upon the parties listed
below by placing a t r u e and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Charles C. Brown, Esq.
Budge W. Call, Esq,
Brown & Brown
505 East 200 South, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the

^l^-f^day

of December, 1994.

ynthia Northitrom
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to

me this ^ A ^ * d a y of December, 1994.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in the State of Utah
My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC

LYNETTE FARMER
10 Exchange Placa #1100
Sait Late City. Utah 84101

tty Comtnlsston Expim
August 24,1W6
STATE OF UTAH

FiLED

Fourth Juocai P-F.r'ot Court

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT GOUjRT- Count, ~ > - at .JU>.»
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAlCARVsAB. $MsT h . C !<;•"•

WATER POWER COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
CASE NO. 900400932
STRAWBERRY WATER USERS
ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation,

DATE: December 15, 1994
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendant, represented by Ryan E. Tibbitts, filed memoranda in support of its motion, and
Plaintiff, represented by Charles C. Brown, filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion.
The Court, after carefully considering the memoranda submitted by counsel, now enters the
following:
RULING
The facts as set forth in Defendant's initial memoranda were not disputed, and
therefore, the Court adopts those facts and accepts them as true. Based upon the unique facts
and circumstances surrounding this matter, the Court is not inclined to award Plaintiffs
attorney fees. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted, and
the case is closed. Counsel for Defendant is instructed to prepare an order consistent with
this ruling.
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Dated at Provo, Utah, this /0_ day of

4J+C-

, 1994.

BY THE COURT
./
^

Lynn W. Davis
cc:

Ryan E. Tibbitts, Esq.
Charles C. Brovm, Esq.

2
9Q£

ADDENDUM B:
Contract

ZMut*

AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT, made and executed as of the 24th day of January,
1933 by and between STRAWBERRY WATER USERS ASSOCIATION, a
Utah Corporation, hereinafter referred to as "Buyer" and WATER POWER
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, hereinafter referred to as "Company*1.

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the Buyer desires to build a new 3500 kw hydropower facility
near the existing Upper Spanish Fork Hydro Plant, (herein after referred
to as "Project"), and

WHEREAS, the Buyer desires to engage the services of the Company on
the Project and the Company desires to perform such services, pursuant
to the terms and conditions of this Agreement as herein set forth.

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants
herein contained and the monetary consideration herein recited, it is
mutally agreed by and between the parties as follows:

1.

WORK TO BE PERFORMED BY THE COMPANY.

The Buyer

hereby engages the Company, and the Company does herejby agree to
perform the following:

A.

General: The Company will design, fabricate, install and

start up penstock and

turbine generator units to the following

specifications:

Two Turbines: (each)
Power - 2450 hp
Speed - 600 rpm
Head Effective - 125 ft
Flow - 200 cfs
Generator: Power - 1750 kw
Speed - 600 rpm
Voltage - 2300 volts
Temp. Rating - 6C°C continuous
Penstock: Size - 2-60 inch diameter
Length - 340 feet each
Existing Wasteway:
wasteway
B.

Repair the overflow crest of existing

Specific: The Company shall proceed diligently to perform

the following in a good and workmanlike manner for the fee as
provided for herein:

TURBINE:
Design and manufacture two Francis turbines to the
specifications of Paragraph 1A. The turbine runner,
wicket gates and gate shafts will be stainless steel as
per HydroWest Group standard specs. Spiral case
and all other related parts will be cast or fabricated
steel.
GENERATOR:
The generator will be designed and manufactured to
HydroWest Group
specifications as per the
nameplate data listed in Paragraph 1A.
The
insulation system will be Class FFFX and the stator
will have a minimum of 6 RTD's to indicate winding

temperature. The generator field will have adequate
WR^ (built in inertia) to permit stable operation for
remote and manual synchronization.
The entire
rotation assembly will have total runaway speed
capability.
EXCITER:
The exciter will be static or brushless and will have
solid state voltage regulation.
SWITCHGEAR:
The switchgear and relay protection will be standard
utility grade designed for HydroWest Group for local
manual and remote operation, including the lower 400
kw Spanish Fork Hydro Plant.
SUPERVISORY CONTROL:
The supervisory control will be designed by
HydroWest Group and manufactured by Digitek
Corporation to remotely control the two main
turbines plus the recently uprated lower 400 kw
Spanish Fork Hydro Plant turbine.
STEP-UP TRANSFORMER:
A step-up transformer, low voltage connection box,
high voltage disconnect with, fuses and lightning
arrestors will be furnished with the following
capabilities:
1.
5900 KYA minimum with provision for 25%
additional capcity from F.O.A.
2. Voltage - 2.3 KV step up to 46 KY with 5 no load
taps of 5% each
ASSEMBLY & INSTALLATION:
Will be by contractor working for Water Power
Company under the direction of HydroWest Group,
Inc.
PENSTOCK:
60" x 5/16" steel with coal tar enamel inner coating
and coal tar outer coating with poly-ken protective
wrap. Sacrificial anode electrolysis protection
INTAKE:
Two with screens and motorized 6' x 6' vertical slide
gates at entrance to each penstock

MEASURING DEVICE:
Mapco Sonic Measuring Device to be installed in 60"
penstock to measure instantaneous and totalized flow
to each turbine
POWERHOUSE:
Insulated
metal
building
30'
x
301 with
thermostatically controlled louvers
Two motorized butterfly valves 60" diameter ahead
of turbine
Two motorized slide (sluice) gates 4f x V for Salem
Canal
Reinforcer concrete box culvert between powerhouse
and Salem Canal
C.

Technical Director: The Company shall furnish a technical

representative qualified to install and erect the equipment to be
furnished hereunder, together with all other onsite or offsite
labor required for the performance of this agreement.

2.

PAYMENT BY OWNER TO THE COMPANY: The Buyer hereby

agrees to pay to the Company for the work to be performed, a sum of
$2,788,000 payable

in monthly installments as specified

in the

attached Exhibit "A", "Construction Control and Payment Schedule11.
He's agreed that failure to meet the payment schedule will delay
extend the compeltion date.

3. INFORMATION

TO BE PROVIDED BY THE BUYER: The Buyer

agrees to provide the Company with complete information concerning
the project and to provide access for the Company to enter the
premises as required to perform the work. The Buyer shall designate
one individual to act as the Buyers representative with respect to the
work to be performed by the Company under this Agreement.

The

person designated as the Buyers representative shall have complete
authority to transmit instructions, receive information, interpret and
define the Buyers policy and decisions and approve payments under
the "Construction Contract and Payment Schedule'1 with respect to
work covered by this Agreement.

INSURANCE AND INDEMNIFICATION:

The Company shall

secure and maintain such insurance as will protect the Company from
claims under Workmen's Compensation acts and from all other claims
for bodily injury, death or property damage which may arise out of the
performance of or failure to perform services by the Company under
this Agreement and the Company does hereby indemnify and hold
harmless

the Buyer from any and all such liability, claims or

obligations. The Company will provide a one-year warranty from the
date of completion for all equipment, and a performance and payment
bond for the project.

5.

CHANGES AND MODIFICATIONS:

This Agreement shall be

modified only by a written agreement setting forth the terms and

conditions of such changes and modifications and the same being
executed by each of the parties hereto.

6.

COMPLETION:

Ail work shall be completed on or before

September 30, 1983 as shown on the attached "Construction Control
and Payment Schedule", identified as Exhibit "A".

7. ADDITIONAL TERMS: The terms and provisions of "Conditions of
Sale", attached hereto as Exhibit "B", are hereby agreed to and
incorporated herein.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands the day
and year f'rrst set forth above.

BUYER

TITLE: \

COMPANY

^

^

^

A

^

TITLE: CrAn/sv^?

WITNESS: y ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ y f T N E S S :

*?

c ^ ^ ^ ^

M,*£,£*£,.
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ADDENDUM C:
Cable Marine, Inc. v . M/V Trust Me II, 632 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1980)
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Cite as 632 F.2d 1344 (1980)

instruction of which Sarris complains in
anyway expressed a view concerning the
credibility of any statement made by the
informant but rather only informed the
jury as to the practical role of informants in
cases of this type.2 Finally, it is clear that
the trial court did give an adequate general
instruction as to the assessment of the credibility of witnesses.3
AFFIRMED.

Southern District of Florida, Norman C.
Roettger, Jr., J., denying it attorney fees
incurred in its successful suit on maritime
lien. The Court of Appeals held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying an award of attorney fees to plaintiff, even though attorney fees were authorized by contract, where plaintiff had declined defendant's generous settlement offers made several months before trial.
Affirmed.

CABLE MARINE, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
M/V TRUST ME II, M. Whiting, Ronald
Gurvin and Small Boat Rentals, Inc.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 80-5181
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Unit 13

1. Federal Civil Procedure «=> 2737.5
Where attorney fees are provided by
contract, a trial court does not possess the
same degree of equitable discretion to deny
such fees that it has when applying statute
allowing for discretionary award; however,
a court, in its sound discretion may decline
to award attorney fees authorized by a contractual provision when it believes that
such an award would be inequitable and
unreasonable.
2. Federal Civil Procedure <$=*2737.5
District court did not abuse its discretion in denying prevailing plaintiff attorney
fees, even though such fees were authorized
by contract, where plaintiff declined defendant's generous settlement offers made
several months before trial.

Dec. 19, 1980.

Plaintiff appealed from a decision of
the United States District Court for the
2. This Court has stated that it is the nature of
certain crimes, including gambling, to often be
undetectable absent the use of government informants. See, United States v. Timberlake,
559 F.2d 1375, 1378. n.7 (5th Cir. 1977).
3.

CABLE MARINE, INC. v. M/V TRUST ME II

The following is an excerpt from the trial
court's instruction to the jury.
Now, you must consider all of the evidence,
but this does not mean that you must accept
all of the evidence as being true or accurate.
You are the sole judges. You and you alone
are the judges of the credibility, or the believability, il the will, of each witness, as well as
the weight to be given his testimony.

Weaver & Weaver, Thomas D. Lardin,
Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.
In weighing the testimony of a witness, you
should consider his relationship to the
government, or to any defendant.
You
should consider his interest, if any, in the
outcome of this case. You should consider
his manner of testifying, his opportunity to
observe or acquire the knowledge that he
testified about. You should consider his candor, openness, fairness and intelligence, and
you should also consider the extent to which
he has been supported, or contradicted by
other creditable evidence.
In short, you may accept or reject the testimony of any witness who appeared in this
courtroom, either in whole or in part.

Ronald Payne, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for
defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before RONEY, FRANK M. JOHNSON,
Jr. and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff appeals from the denial of attorney's fees incurred in its successful suit on a
maritime lien. Holding the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fees, we affirm.
Plaintiff filed suit on October 20, 1978, to
recover for repairs it performed on a fortyone foot vessel owned by defendant. Plaintiff claimed $3,960 as the amount owed,
plus costs and attorney's fees. Defendant,
contending that it was overcharged for the
repairs, had sent a check for $2,500 to plaintiff prior to the filing of suit, but plaintiff
refused to accept this payment.
The parties engaged in settlement negotiations between the time the suit was filed
and the time of trial. In March, 1979, defendant offered to settle the action in its
entirety for $3,750. This offer was refused.
At least six months prior to trial, defendant
raised its settlement offer to $4,200, but
this offer was also declined.
The bench trial took place on December
26 and 27, 1979. Finding that some overcharges did in fact exist, the court awarded
plaintiff $3,460, plus interest and court
costs. After a brief hearing, the court
ruled that each party should bear its own
attorney's fees. Plaintiff appeals from this
ruling.
Attorney's fees generally may be awarded only when authorized by statute or contract. See, e. g., Kessler v. Pennsylvania
National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co.,
531 F.2d 248, 255 (5th Cir. 1976); Aerosonic
Corp. v. Trodync Corp., 402 F.2d 223, 228
(5th Cir. 1968). Attorney's fees are authorized in this case by the work order for the
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repairs, which provides for the allowance of
reasonable fees to plaintiff in the event it is
compelled to initiate collection proceedings.
The district court, however, held that it
would be unreasonable to assess attorney's
fees against defendant. Although its reasons were not clearly articulated, the court
apparently believed that plaintiff had acted
unreasonably in not accepting either of the
earlier settlement offers made by defendant and in forcing the cause to trial.
[1] Where attorney's fees are provided
by contract, a trial court does not possess
the same degree of equitable discretion to
deny such fees that it has when applying a
statute allowing for a discretionary award.
Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 226
(5th Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, a court in its
sound discretion may decline to award attorney's fees authorized by a contractual
provision when it believes that such an
award would be inequitable and unreasonable. See, e. g., United States v. Mountain
States Construction Co., 588 F.2d 259, 263
(9th Cir. 1978); Manchester Gardens v.
Great West Life Assurance Co., 205 F.2d
872, 878 & n.14 (D.C.Cir.1953); Schmidt v.
Interstate Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n.,
421 F.Supp. 1016, 1019 (D.D.C.1976); Consumers Time Credit, Inc. v. Remark Corp.,
259 F.Supp. 135, 137 (E.D.Pa.1966). In
Manchester Gardens, for example, the court
held that attorney's fees may be withheld if
the claim was pursued unnecessarily.
[2] In this case, defendant had made
generous settlement offers several months
before trial. In fact, the second offer of
$4,200 was only slightly less than the total
of the full amount claimed by plaintiff as
the cost of repairs, excluding the charges
conceded by plaintiff at trial to be unjustified, and the amount claimed by plaintiff's
attorney for his fees up to the date of trial.
Although the plaintiff may have been
compelled to initiate a lawsuit to recover
the repair costs, the district court could well
have concluded that plaintiff acted unreasonably in incurring needless expense by
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BOUDLOCHE v. HOWARD TRUCKING CO., INC.
Cite as 632 F.2d 1346 (1980)

pursuing the suit beyond the offers of payment. We cannot hold that the court
abused its discretion in denying an award of
attorney's fees to plaintiff.
AFFIRMED.

Edgar J. BOUDLOCHE, Petitioner,
v.
HOWARD TRUCKING CO., INC., Northwest Insurance Co. and Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs, U.
S. Department of Labor, Respondents.
No. 80-3045.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Unit A
Dec. 19, 1980.

age on the ground that his maritime employment was insubstantial.
Reversed and remanded.

Workers' Compensation <3=>262
Worker who was directed to regularly
perform some portion of what was indisputably longshoring work at fully equipped
docks and, for at least some part of his
work was required to perform total maritime job at unequipped docks was within
coverage of Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act though his employer also assigned him broader duties as
truck driver, and he was not beyond coverage on the ground that his maritime employment was insubstantial. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, §§ 1 et seq., 2(3, 4), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901
et seq., 902(3, 4).

Weigand & Siegrist, Christopher B. Siegrist, Houma, La., for petitioner.
Carin A. Clauss, Sol. of Labor, Mark C.
Walters, Gilbert T. Renaut, U. S. Dept. of
Labor, Washington, D. C, Roger J. Larue,
Jr., Metairie, La., for respondents.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Benefits Review Board.

Before
COLEMAN,
Chief
Judge,
The Benefits Review Board found that
CHARLES CLARK and REAVLEY, Cirworker had not been within the coverage of
cuit Judges.
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act because his maritime
CHARLES CLARK, Circuit Judge:
employment was insubstantial. On petition
A majority of the Benefits Review Board
for review the Court of Appeals, Charles
asserts
that Congress did not intend for the
Clark, Circuit Judge, held that worker who
was directed to regularly perform some por- Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers* Comtion of what was indisputably longshoring pensation Act (Act) to cover employees
work at fully equipped docks and, for at whose maritime employment was insubleast some part of his work was required to stantial. Because the Supreme Court has
perform total maritime job at unequipped held Congress intended to cover workers
locks was within coverage though his em- when at least some part of their duties
ployer also assigned him broader duties as involved such employment, we reverse and
truck driver, and he was not beyond cover- remand.

The facts as found by the Board are as
follows. The claimant, Edgar J. Boudloche,
was employed by Howard Trucking Company, Inc., (Howard) as a truck driver. Howard was engaged in the business of transporting oil field and marine equipment used
in drilling for oil and gas offshore and on
land. Boudloche hauled heavy oil field
equipment on a large truck and a flatbed
trailer rig. Approximately half of his runs
were from one land based site to another.
The other half required him to either pick
up or deliver equipment at a dock. Ten to
twenty percent of the docks worked by
Boudloche had no loading or unloading
equipment or personnel. At such docks
Boudloche did all of the work of loading
and unloading the equipment by himself.
The remaining docks where Boudloche
picked up or delivered equipment were
equipped with cranes and laborers called
"roustabouts" to load and unload. To develop good will for his employer, Boudloche
was expected to assist in the loading and
unloading process even at those well
equipped facilities. Boudloche estimated
that he had a delivery or a pick-up two or
three times a week at a poorly equipped
dock where he had to do the loading or
unloading himself.
Boudloche would use either a winch or a
gin pole on his truck to load or unload at
unequipped docks. This required that he
board the barge being loaded or unloaded to
secure or release cables on the cargo. Only
2xk to 5 percent of his overall work time
was spent loading or unloading cargo at
unequipped dock facilities where he had to
board vessels.
On the day of his injury, Boudloche was
assigned to pick up several small boats used
in oil and gas drilling operations. These
boats were to be picked up at an unequipped dock facility. When he arrived at
the dock with his truck, the boats were tied
up at the water's ei\gc. The dock was no
more than a gravel and shell-covered slope
leading down into the water. Boudloche
backed his trailer to the water's edge and
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ran his winch line from the back of his cab
along the trailer bed and tied it to the front
of the first boat. He then winched the boat
out of the water and onto his trailer. He
loaded two boats in this manner. When he
attempted to load the third boat, which was
made of steel and much heavier than the
first two, the boat slipped and fell on the
claimant. Boudloche sustained a crushed
pelvis and urological injuries.
Since Boudloche was at a dock at the
water's edge when he was injured, he was
within the Act's waterfront situs provision.
33 U.S.C. § 902(4). The single issue is
whether a claimant who regularly performs
indisputably maritime operations, but which
maritime operations constitute only a small
portion of his overall working time, occupies a status covered by the Act.
Section 2(3) of the Act provides:
The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person
engaged in longshoring operations, and
any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, . . . .
33 U.S.C. § 902(3). The Board determined
that the Act required a substantial portion
of an employee's duties be in longshoring
operations to be covered. They concluded
that because Boudloche spent only 2'/2 to 5
percent of his overall working time performing the full maritime function of a
longshoreman, he did not meet their "substantial portion" of duties requirement.
In Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v.
Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 53
L.Ed.2d 320 (1977), the Supreme Court held
the Act's status requirement was met by a
terminal laborer who sometimes worked at
shore-based jobs and at other times performed a longshoreman's function. They
defined longshoremen as "persons whose
employment is such that they spend at least
some of their time in indisputably longshoring operations %y(4)" 432 U.S. at 273, 97
S.Ct. at 2362. Two years later, in P. C.
Pfeiffer Co., Inc. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 100
S.Ct. 328, 62 L.Ed.2d 225, the Court held

